Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Electoral Autocracies
Research Question and Motivation
As of 2022, more than $72\%$ of the world population lives under autocracies. Opposition in these regimes is often deemed as weak and fragmented. However, opposition political parties in autocracies are the locus of the most organized form of dissent against the incumbent, and little research focuses on these parties. My dissertation project examining opposition political parties’ electoral strategies in authoritarian settings aims to unravel mechanisms leading to liberalizing outcomes. To understand how and when opposition political parties pave the way for autocratic reversal, I start from the assumption in the literature that opposition coalitions are needed to effectively challenge autocratic incumbents. I investigate an understudied aspect of autocratic reversal: ``under what conditions do some opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes successfully form a pre-electoral coalition (PEC), while others fail to coordinate?’’
Argument
Existing literature highlights specific institutional characteristics and the level of repression as the primary explanatory factors in coalition formation. In my research, I show that the agency of these parties matters as much as the context that they operate. I theorize on two factors: (1) internal organization and cohesiveness of each party, and (2) ideological polarization of parties in the opposition. More importantly, I argue that these two factors are not independent of each and that different combinations of these two factors matter in coalition-building. I offer cross-sectional and cross-temporal evidence on electoral coalitions in electoral authoritarian regimes. My research shows that party institutions matters. Particularly, I find that highly polarized opposition parties can come to an agreement only if they have strong internal structure. With this research, I contribute to the emerging literature on opposition coordination, and provide critical insights for opposition actors at the normative level.
Methodological Approach
I adopt a mixed-methodological approach - large-N quantitative analysis, causal case selection, and site-intensive methods - to explore how political parties’ organizational structures and ideological and political agenda diversity explain opposition bargaining prior to the elections. In testing my theory, I draw on an original dataset on elections in electoral authoritarian regimes and archival materials, interviews with party chairs and co-chairs, and shadowing insights. I focus on Turkey in my fieldwork, but I also explore elections in Guatemala, Hungary, and North Macedonia as influential and pathway cases.
Empirical Chapter 1
In the first empirical chapter, I use an original dataset to test the implications of the theory. This original dataset covers all elections under electoral authoritarian regimes from 1970 to 2019. The quantitative analysis shows that opposition parties with high levels of intra-party cohesiveness and high levels of inter-party polarization in terms of party ideology increase the likelihood of forming a PEC. Alongside the within party and between party factors, the analysis finds support for the institutional setting. The significant relationship between the interaction of these factors shows that the ideological polarization only makes coalitions more likely when the intra-party divisions have lower values. Several robustness tests corroborate the findings.
Empirical Chapter 2
In the second empirical chapter, I assess the validity of my analysis using a diagnostic causal case approach and focus on influential and pathway cases. Quantitative analysis of electoral coalitions informs associations and how within and between party divisions create incentives for these parties. Yet, the causal order of forming a coalition cannot be confidently inferred using this analysis alone. Thus, the second evidence relies on a small-N analysis of PECs from disparate political contexts. Analysis of these cases help: (1) to confirm the hypothesized relationship discovered in the quantitative analysis and rival test explanations and (2) to investigate the specific nature of different conditions conducive to coalition among the opposition. These are explored through a process-tracing and provide powerful smoking gun evidence linking cause to effect.
Empirical Chapter 3
In the final empirical chapter, I investigate the proposed question using the case of opposition political parties in Turkey during the Justice and Development Party regime (2002 - present). Mainly, I focus on two elections: (1) the 2018 general election as a negative case in which the opposition formed a coalition but failed to find a joint candidate, and (2) the 2023 general elections as a positive case in which the opposition successfully formed a coalition through joint-lists and joint candidate strategies. This chapter provides further support to my argument and I show that having high levels of intra-party cohesiveness and ideological diversity enabled these parties to form a coalition. This chapter relies on three different pieces of evidence: (1) site-intensive methods that include elite interviews, shadowing, and participant observation, (2) process tracing, and (3) quantitative text analysis of party manifestos and party leaders’ tweets.
Grants and Fundings
My dissertation research has been supported by the William A. Steiger Fund for Legislative Studies of the APSA Centennial Grant, Craigie Fellowship, and GSU’s Library Dissertation Award.